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The Influence of Explicit Instructions to

Pla~

Upon Performance.

The purpose of this investigation is to study the
measurable influence of explicit instructions to plan upon
the performance of complex tasks as contrasted with performance of the same tasks under such spontaneous tendency to
plan as may be present without explicit instructions.
The subjects used in this experiment were sixty
children between the ages of eleven and fourteen years.

This

group was divided into an experimental group of fifteen boys
and fifteen girls and a control group of the same number of
boys and girls.

The subjects in the control group were

paired with the subjects in the experimental group according
to sex, age and I. Q.
After the pairing was completed, the subjects of
both groups were asked to perform two tasks.

The first task

consisted in arranging fifty sticks of different lengths,
colors and thicknesses in ten boxes in the best possible
order.

The second task was the construction of a bird-house

out of several parts.

These tasks were selected because

they require definite steps to be followed in their solution.

standard procedure was followed throughout, except in the

.'

case of the experimental group, who received explicit instructions to plan their work.
A record of each child's performance was kept.

The

time required by him to complete the tasks, the number of movee
and the number of trials were recorded.

Also, any evidence of

planning or not planning was noted and an attempt was made, to
study the effect of such behavior upon the performance of the
subject.
Planning as referred to in this experiment is
synonymous with reflective thinking, or thinking with an aim
or purpose or end toward which the thinking tends.

It is the

kind of thinking especially adapted to solving complex
problems as opposed to random thinking which leads to no particular or definite termination.
In productive thinking, planning is necessary in
order to attain the end of thought, which is the solution of
the problems of everyday life.

Random thinking is a meta-

phorical Pandora's box, out of which fly many of the ills
humans are heir to.

Reflective thought, on the other hand,

is the only hope left with which we may right these wrongs,
political, social, economic and educational, let loose by
random thinking.
We assume with Porteus, Goddard, Binet and others
that the capacity to plan is related to intelligent solutions

3,

of problems.

By our instructions to plan we hope to enable

the subject to direct his activities with foresight, ~nd to
plan according to ends-in-view, or purpose of which he is
aware.

In short, we hope to convert action that is largely

impulsive into intelligent action.
One of the first investigators to point out that
planning is a most important capacity in intelligent behavior
was Stanley Porteous (41:65).

In discussing characteristics

of the feeble-minded, he states that, generally speaking, they
cannot be trusted to engage, unsupervised, in work requiring
forethought in planning, care and judgment in execution.

He

says that the feeble-minded have a place in industry, but it
is in doing work which takes plain, straight-forward, piecemeal effort, wherein there is no need to envisage the whole,
nor to make the necessary adjustments so that the finished
result will harmonize with a preconceived plan, for these
are beyond feeble-minded capacity.

If any individual is

found who is capable of doing these things, it is almost
certain that he is not a mental defective, no matter how
inferior his abstract intelligence may be.
In a later chapter S. Porteus (41:66) says, "In
their attempt to adjust themselves to the general social as
well as the school situation, the most outstanding weakness
of the defective seemed to be lack of planning capacity.

They seem unable to keep the end of a task clearly in

~nd,

or to adopt a critical attitude towards their own work and
to make the adjustments necessary to the

fulfillm~nt

of the

plan or design as originally conceived."
H. H. Goddard agrees with Porteus (41:66) in describing the capacities of the highest grade feeble-minded
when he notes their ability to do good work, but only under
directions.

He claims they are unable to plan anything.

The value ot a manls lite and the effectiveness
of his work, according to Wm. F. Book (8:24), depend (1) on
the character of his ideals or purposes and plans; (2) on the
intensity of his desire for realization of these, or on the
strength and persistence of his determination to carry them
out; (3) on the amount of energy and health at his disposal
for their realization and (4) on the kind and amount of
knowledge and skill which he has acquired to aid him in
finding the best way of obtaining them.
Concerning planning, Wm. H. Burton (6:558) says,
1I0 ne

of the marks of intelligence and speCial ability is

foresight and anticipatory planning.

The stupid, the care-

less, the shiftless and lazy do not plan.·
In 1921 the Editor of the Journal ot Education
asked seventeen leading investigators to contribute to a
symposium on, "What I conceive intelligence to be and by
what means it can best be measured by group

tests."

o.
Many of these men included the capacity to pl;n in
their definition of intelligence.

E. L. Thorndike (22:124)

in his discussion of intelligent behavior states,. "It would,
however, be difficult and probably unwise to try to separate
off sharply the responses concerned with directly sensed
situations from responses concerned with planning, or those
concerned with concrete features of things and men from those
connected with ideas and symbols.

The power of response to

ideas rather than direct experience may be called the more
intellectual variety of intellect."
L. M. Terman (22:127) conceives an individual as
intelligent in proportion as he is able to carryon abstract
thinking.

"Add a large measure of ability to associate ab-

stract ideas into complex systems and a pick-and-shovel man
can design a new type of engine, draft the plans for a skyscraper or discover a curative serum."
F. N. Freeman (22:133) would include, among other
things, in a definition of intelligence, the judicious managment of the processes of learning or reflection; the ad(jP-·
tiOfi· of intellectual purposes and the adaptation of means
to their satisfaction; and sensitiveness to significant
connections between experiences which illuminate one another
or which are effective in building up systems of thought.
L. L. Thurstone (22:201) distinguishes between the
bright and the profound intellect.

The former aims for effect-

-iveness in the immediate present,

while the latter deals with

earlier and more abstract relations in its

adjustments~'

Such

a profound mind is concerned with the analysis of temporarily
remote ends.

He conceives intelligence to be the" capacity to

inhibit instinctive behavior in an unfinished stage of its
formation and to modify it at that stage by means of an
imaginal stimulus which is relatively remote from that which
is immediately and perceptually present.

The imaginal stimulus

in intelligent behavior becomes conscious as an alternative
to be controlled, accepted or rejected rationally.
Herbert Woodrow's (22:207) concept of intelligent
behavior is simply the degree to which it attains success,
but success has no real value except by some reference to
want, desire, intention, plan or purpose.
Michael Maher, S. J., (31:583), too, in comparing
animal behavior with that of human or rational behavior,
states that brute creatures do not exhibit any individual
free variation in method and plan of action, and that intellectual progress, which ought to mark the presence of
personal intelligence.

From this statement of Maher's it

is evident that he agrees with other authors that the capacity
to plan is related to intelligence.
Very few attempts have been made to test planning
ability as such.

In 1912 M. R. Fernald and W. Healy (12)

experimented with a series of tests of planning ability and
by means of an ingenious puzzle-box they presented a problem

in which success was dependent upon working through a series

of operations in proper sequence.

By manipulating a

b~tton

hook through a hole in the side of a box, rings attached to
various strings could be released and the box opened, the
subject being able to plan the operations by looking at the
mechanism through a glass top.

The test was scored on speed,

but the record was so affected by the manual dexterity required that it did not constitute a good test of planning and
so never came into general use.
In 1922 D. R. Morgenthau (34) made a study of, "Some
Well Known Mental Tests," which she compared and evaluated.
In the course of her work she made an experimental study to
,

secure a measure of p1anfulness by using various parts of a
number of tests.

The elements in each test that seemed to

measure planfu1ness were selected.

These were divided into

two separate sets and results compared.

The correlation was

.763 between the two tests, which was fairly high, since
seventeen was the highest score on each section.

She does

not claim this to be a criterion to prove that the tests
actually measured the trait which she presupposed it would.
She does claim, however, that it is better than any single
test, because it includes a variety of materials.
The most recent work in the field of testing
planning ability is that of Stanley D. Porteus (41:67).
subjects were

10w-grad~,

feeble-minded children.

His

He measured

the time required for them to get out of a locked room, the

8.

problem being complicated for the more intelligent by making

.'

them go through certain preparatory steps before the key to
the room could be obtained and used.

It was found that this

method admitted of a rough classification of children by
ability.

Those of the lowest grades could merely turn the

key and open the door, children of better planning capacity
were able to climb on a chair 8.nd obtain the key when it hung
out of reach.

Still others learned after several demonstrat-

ions how to obtain a second key, unlock a cupboard, climb on
a chair, and prooure the door key.

Beyond proving that de-

fectives were particularily slow at learning the sequence of
steps in a complicated situation, the test was of little value
as it could not be properly standardized.
Another series of tests conducted by Porteus (41:67)
used street plans as testing material.

The problem set the

defective was to follow directions so as to make his way on
the plan from one designated point to another.

This proved

to be more of a test of memory for directions than planning,
but it was while drawing an imaginary system of roads, in the
form of the present nine-year design of the maze tests, that
the idea of using a series of mazes occurred to the experimenter.
The problem of finding a way out of a printed maze,
in which blind alleys occurred at various pOints, seemed to
Porteus very much more a test of planning capacity than merely
following instructions.

A series of these tests was made in

9.

1919 and revised in 1933.
the capacities of

Their author claims they measure

fore~hought

.'

and planning, prudence and

mental alertness in meeting new situations.

Attitudes.

Percival Symonds (48) reviews the meaning of the
term "attitude ll in a paper entitled,

If

What is Attitude? I.

In the writings of educators and psychologists he found the
term referred to as (1) great organic drives, more familiarly
known as purposes or plans; (2) muscular set or adjustment;
(3) generalized conduct; (4) neural set or readiness to make
certain reactions; (5) emotional concomitant of action; (6)
the feeling concomitant to action; (7) verbal responses indicating liking or disliking, acceptance or rejection.

This

author concludes that none of these refer to conduction units
which yield a peculiar type of reaction that may be called an
attitude.

He thinks the term is a duplicate of skill or habit

or, that it refers to particular features of reaction units.
Read Bain (5) defines attitude as acquired and conditioned action patterns that motivate human social behavior,
and says that attitudes which do not motivate adjustment
(or maladjustment) have little significance for human beings.
His attitude theory rests on the fact that the stimuli capa-

1

10

b1e of activating the neuromuscular mechanisms, whether innate
or acquired, are very numerous and very variable.

.'

Under

appropriate conditions, almost any stimuli may be substituted
for the stimuli originally adequate to activate any given
action pattern.

While the functional motor mechanisms, innate

or acquired, are relatively stable, many quite diverse'stimuli
may be integrated with these specific responses.

The result

is a new total stimulus-response action pattern which is
partly original but which in most human behavior is largely
the result of experimental conditioning in cultural situations.
The problem of human motivation is the problem of acquired
responses.

This writer believes that the term attitude and

opinion refer in a general way to types of acquired actionpatterns that are definitely concerned with human motivation.
A.s previously stated, an attempt wes made in this
experiment to establish an attitude of planning through explicit instructions to plan.

The term attitude as used in

this studW is similar to attitude as defined in an experimental account of a study of conscious attitude by H. M.
Clark (10).

This author defines attitude as ideas or meanings

which have been set off in the organism by external and preceding or accompanying determination.

These ideas, he says,

do not characterize the particular situation, but do characterize the particular and the immediate nature of the responding
organism.

They may, therefore, vary the nature of the re-

sponse which the situation brings about.

Attitudes are in-

~· ____-------------------------------------------------------------=l=l~.
~

tellectual and emotional.

In both case the attitude is a
~

meaning or idea developing in the organism from a situation
in the enviroment.

The intellectual attitude modifies the

response in the direction of the modifying idea.

The emotional

attitude modifies the response, but this modification is due
not only indirectly to the idea causing the emotion, but
directly to the emotion.

It is the intellectual attitude

with which the present study is concerned.
Clark began his study of attitudes not from concern
about the nature of consciousness that makes up the attitude,
but from the concern about the objectively determinable
modifications of reBponse brought about by the presence of
the particular attitude.

This is the aim of the present in-

vestigation also.
Clark's investigation studied both the intellectual
and the emotional attitude.

The idea selected for the first

study was that generalization was to be expected from a series
of separate problems being solved.

For the second study the

idea selected for investigation was that one is better or
poorer in the performance of a particular task than other
members of one's group.
relation to the

Both these ideas were studied in

chang~produced

in consciOUS functioning and

behavior at the time of learning and in relation to their
value when recall was attempted.

The problem was also to

find out if individuals of different mentalities and different chronoligical ages reacted in the same manner to

12.
-~--------------------------------------------------------------~~~

III""~

these variations of attitudei and to discover the effect of

.'

the attitude when the generalization had different degrees of
complexity.

In every case the subject was led to believe

that the problem of learning was being investigated and not
that the attitudes were under observation.

They were also

paired for intelligence so as to eliminate this as a factor
explanatory of differences in performance.
In the study of intellectual attitude, nonsense
material was used.

The attitude was brought about by vari-

ations in the instructions accompanying the main problem.
In one group, the subjects were given no instructions; the
second group were instructed to seek a generalization; and
the third group was given the generalization outright.

Clark's

first group was similar to the control group and his second
group to the experimental group of the present study.
Group one, the author calls the trial-and-error
group.

Group two displayed a tendency to plan either native

or because some element in the situation caused them to try
a plan.

This often resulted in getting off on the wrong

track, after which they seemed unable to discard the unsatisfactory plan.

Group three seemed to have a tendency from

the first to plan, and after a few unsuccessful trials hit
upon a satisfactory plan and discarded immediately those
which did not work.
The writer concludes that if subjects are divided
into two groups, one of higher and one of lower I. Q., the

;~..~~we

of learning with any gfven attitude is dependent in

upon intelligence.

He found, also, that the attit~de

resulting from no information as to progress made gave better
eonditions for learning than attitudes resulting from the
knowledge of failure or success.
Stella B. McCharles (32) studied the effect

o~

certain attitudes on the ability to solve problems. Each
group was given instructions calculated to produce a

di~ferent

\ attitude, such as pugnacity, friendliness, alertness, relaxation, and no attitude at all, except the problem.

Groups

while maintaining a certain attitude solved the Yerkes Multiple Choice Problems.

Questions were asked to determine

whether they had been able to take and maintain the attitude.
A significant difference was found in the results obtained
trom the groups tested.

The pugnacity attitude promoted

4efinitely a higher efficiencw in solving problems.
S. Sandersen (43) found in an experiment to

s~udy

intention in motor learning that the intention to learn is
the essential factor in the learning process.

The tasks set

were learning to trace a stylus maze and a number sheet of
identical pattern.

The specific mental set was instilled in

the learner by specific instructions without his awareness of
future application.

To one group instructions to learn the

pattern were given, and to another group instructions to work
quickly.

When both speed and pattern group shifted fron

number sheet to maze, to be learned for speed, the pattern

l4 •

.• intention proved superior.

Less transference occurred from

.'

maze to number sheet, with no superiority for the pattern.

An experimental study of observational attitudes
was made by O. D. Anderson (3).

His problem was to determine

some of the factors which may enter in· to modify the formal
instructions of an experiment.

He presented the subjects with

colors and tones, and directed them to note and characterize
both the initial way of taking the experience and also any
ehange in the mode which might occur in the: period of peroeption.

Five attitudes were found; the casual survey, in-

quiring survey of objects, critical survey of

su~ject

as

subject, particularizing survey of objects, personal evaluation of objects as failing to conform to some conventional
standard.
In a second part of the same experiment the subject
was given characterizations of these attitudes and told to
assume one and report on the course of the experience occurring
under it.

It was found impossible to maintain the particular

attitude throughout a period of stimUlation any longer than
tive to ten seconds; the performance demanded by the formal
-1nstructions appeared about half the time.
The investigator pOints out the inadequacy of formal
instruction even with trained subjects.

It is also evident

to him that the view which regards performance as a uresponse"
unequivocally determined by stimulus is inadequate.

----------------------------------------------.
~O.

...

~..

w.

Peters states that two attitudes are possible to

observe in an experiment.

These are the leptisch, or passive,

and the ktetische, or active, the latter being induced by more
difficult tasks and tending to give better results.

He claims

that some observers natura+ly assume one attitude and some the
other.
To test and in general substantiate these statements of Peters, G. Luntowski (27) conducted an experiment
in which the subjects were required to divide a given linear
distance into three equal parts by shifting beads on a string.
The subjects were young adults of both sexes.
Ten observers in this experiment were given no
directions as to the attitude to be assumed or method used.
They were questioned as to how they performed it when they
had finished.

Out of eighty-two experiments, sixty were

carried out wholly actively and eleven wholly passively.
Seven subjects observed actively four

ti~es

as frequently

as passively and the remaining four subjects were more
passive than active.

The active group showed more gener-

alized body movements, corrected the position of the beads
more often, and took longer for the task.

They had more

restricted attention span, tended to break the space into
sections successfully, and were rarely conscious of the
whole.

They used only one hand, while the passive group

moved the beads simultaneously with both hands.
were smaller in the active group.

The errors

,..,

16.

------------------------------------------------------------------~
In the second part of the same experiment four

.

active subjects and three passive subjects were selected.
An equal number of instructions favoring active and passive
attitudes were given in variable order, the statements of the
subjects again taken following

~he

tasks.

The active in-

structions were followed every time successfully in almost
all cases.

The passive instructions were followed completely

by only one subject every time, seventy per cent of the time
by five subjects and never by the remaining subjects.

The

same differences were noted as to the time, errors, etc. as
were found in the first experiment.
The author concludes that while most subjects tend
strongly to one attitude, the active can usually be assumed.
The difference of progress that would be developed
by an attitude of mechanical grasping as compared with the
natural attitude of learning was studied by S. Aoki (2).
story was read to three groups of subjects.

A

The first group

was instructed to learn it mechanically, the second group to
grasp the general meaning, and the third group to reproduce
the contents in answer to four prepared questions.

Aoki

noted that reproduction was most difficult for group one,
that group two grasped the material as a whole, and that
group three did the best job of reproducing.

From these

results he concludes that analytical instruction is not
effective because it results in an attitude of mechanical
grasping of the material to be learned.

-- ______------------------------------------~1~7.

~~

Frances Wells (51) found in the course of an ex~

tensive study of affective experience that feeling varies
markedly with the nature of the mental attitude or "set" which
the subject adopts immediately before the stimulus is presented.

This led her to study the effect of certain specific

attitudes upon feeling.

These attitudes were the critical

affective, the critical perceptive, and the naive or commonsense attitude.

Three different groups of subjects were

given three different sets of instructions.

Group one re-

ceived general instructions requiring a description of the
total experience from beginning to end.

Group two received

specific attitudinal instructions in which the subjects were
required to adopt a particular observational attitude as defined in the instructions.

Group three received no instruc-

tions whatever.

All subjects were asked to give an intro-

spective report.

The effect upon reaction to the stimulus

is reported in the case of each attitude.

The results show

that the attitude toward which one approaches an affective
situation plays an important part in determining ones reaction to it.

The nature of the affective reaction varies

widely under different attitudes.
G. Meyers (33) studied the effect of the examination
set on memory.

His subjects were instructed to study for a

particular kind of examination such as true-false, completion,
multiple-choice or essay.

He found that for recognition tests

memory, set is of slight importance.

For recog-

nition tests of delayed memory or for recall tests of

~mediate

or delayed memory, recall sets are superior to recognition
sets.

For completion type of recall examination . set is

superior throughout.

For recall of facts in organized fashion,

the essay type of examination is best.
The work of H. Helson (18) i8 based upon the fact
that mental sets have usually been attributed to their connection with or effect upon past experience and association.
This view, the author states, is expressed by D. Starch, who
says, liThe particular meaning given a group of sensations is
determined not only by the general uses of previous experiences but also by the particular system of past associations
dominant in the mind at the time; that is, meaning is determined by the present setting of the mind. II
Helson's opinion is that when instructions evoke a
response which has not been made in the past or one which
would never have been expected on the basis of the subjects'
past behavior, the theory which allows such factors as set or
instructions merely to select or act in accordance with past
experience is untenable.

He thinks psychologists are prone

to emphasize those cases in which past experience helps us in
meeting new situations and to neglect the equally numerous
cases in which past experience prevents us from making adequate
adjustments to novel demands.

Past

exper1~ce

and associations

must be made effective by factors inhering within the situation
confrpnting the organism or else they may fail to functton or
may be a positive hindrance.
To prove his position the author exposed normal
playing cards and test cards (altered in various ways).
subjects were asked to name the card.

The

Those who were very

familiar with cards felt certain that they could not be wrong
in reporting the card as belonging in a certain suit.

In

these cases past experience made it hard to see clearly and
freshly what is novel in a situation.
From his results Helson's conclusions are that
instructions, calling for now one kind of activity, now
another, determine the type and adequacy of the response more
than do practice, richness of association, or past experience.
This is explained by the fact that the instructions determine
what resources the organism will use in solving its problems
through their effect upon set and type of activity used.

If

past experience and associations are to be effective in determining present responses', they must be organized, directed
and set into action by the operation of some factor contained
within the stimulus situation.

Suggestion.

Whether the mental set or attitude which one attempts
to establish will modify the subjects'response, depends in

~

____----------------------________________________~2~0~.~
~

part upon the suggestibility of the subject.

What is the

value of this suggestibility?

A. Vierkandt (50) in a paper which he calls, "New
Views of the Nature of Suggestion," says that the popular idea
of suggestion rests on two false assumptions.

First, that

man's normal behavior is rational, and second,

t~at

human

beings are independent units making independent judgments and
decisions.

He says verbal suggestion is thought to consist in

a sort of crippling of mental life.
Vierkandt insists that in reality man is not an
isolated rational creature.
universal, not abnormal.

Verbal influence is natural and

From childhood man accepts without

resistance the views of those around him.
conditionally credulous.
to be critical.
way.

The child is un-

Only by experience does he learn

Even adults are critical only in a limited

We accept the beliefs of a person we trust and think

we are judging independently on rational grounds.

He suggests

abandoning the term suggestion for influence.

A. Herzberg (20), who has made an analysis of suggestion phenomena and the theory of suggestion, says that
suggestions are not based on single unified mechanism, but
arise from inter and contra action between very numerous and
varied, partly inhibitory and partly favorable factors.

These

lie in the suggestee, in the suggestor, in the environment and
in the content and type of reports by outsiders.

r':·___----------------------2l~.
Those inherent in the suggestee are specific tendencies such as easy involy.em~ntof the sleep centers, special
wishes, experiences, views, habits, and after-effects of
experiences recently undergone.

Such factors favor or hinder

very definite attitudes and are thus specific content factors.
Further we find the basic tendency to believe and obey, the
emotional resonance, a desire for comradeship and subordination
As inhibiting factors we find the

instincts of aggression,

avoidance, resistance and leadership.

These determine the

adoption or rejection of given attitudes.
specific but plastic.

They are not

The habit of critical thought also

acts as an inhibitory factor.
There are three types of influence according to
Herzberg.

The first is directed toward critical thought and

takes place through'. reason.

The second takes place on the

basis of specific tendencies, wishes and habits of the suggestee.

The third type, which is irrational, takes place. upon

the basis of plastic factors.

This last is suggestive only

and on condition that it takes place in spite of the personal
strivings, experiences, views B.nd habits of the recipient.
The first type of influence mentioned by A.
Herzberg is the kind which we hoped to exert upon the subjects of the present experiment.

Binet defines this in-

fluence or suggestion as obedience to a mental influence
coming from another.

,.,

.
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Numerous studies have been made to determine the
nature of suggestion and its effect upon reaction.

.'

These

experiments have studied suggestibility in relation to motor
reactions, or to sensations or beliefs.

Only such as are in

some manner related to the present study will be reviewed.
As early as 1896
with children and found that

M. H. Small (46) experimented
two~undred-ninety-one

out of

three-hundred-eighty-one were affected by illusions of smell,
of taste, and of sight.

To produce the illusion of smell

the experimenter sprayed water into the air and asked the
children to write down the name of the perfume they smelled.
For the illusion of taste he used sugar, salt And distilled
water.

A toy camel with a string around its neck was used

for the illusion of sight.

When a windlass was turned the

camel seemed to be pulled, but in reality it remained stationary.

Small concluded from the results of this study that

suggestibility in children is a universal condition, very high
in degree, and largely in control of those who know the child
mind.
The suggested effect of printed mottoes on the
estimation of linear magnitude was investigated by J. Brand
(9).

His subjects were required to reproduce lines varying

in length from twelve to thirty-four inches, which were
represented by intervals between two pegs.

The subject re-

produced the interval by spacing two smaller pegs on a ledge
near him.

The words "short ll and "long" were printed on cards

~~
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rigid.
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The subject would then report a feeling of tight-

ening in his own hand.
gressive lines.

The second test was suggestion

ty

pro-

The subject had to say if one line. was shorter

or longer than the previous one.

Suggestion by illusion of

warmth was the third test used.

Here the subject had to dis-

tinguish between the relative warmth of lamps held in each
hand.

The fourth test was the hand levitation test.

The

subject placed his hand palm down on the table and the experimenter placed his hand over it.

He then gradually raises

his hand from the subject's' a.nd suggests IIYour hand is light't,
lilt is leaving the table.

The fifth test is the suggestion

by progressive weights, in which the subject must report the

difference in weights after the first four.

To induce a strong

degree of suggestion the fidelity-of-report method was used.
In this test two colored pictures were used and questions concerning facts not found in the pictures were asked.

The last

test was contradictory suggestions as to lengths of lines made
by the experimenter.

In the course of the experiment Aveling and Hargreaves
found that certain cases proved very suggestible to all tests,
or nearly all, while others accepted practically no suggestions.
This, they think, pOints to the fact that suggestibility is
strongly marked in some subjects.
Margaret Otis (38) says, "To accept a suggestion
shows an absence of the ability to resist.
passive state.

It is a lack, a

Resistance is something positive, is an

2L
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ability or trait and must correspond to the quality, number,
~

or mode of functioning of the nerve cells and fibres of the
nervous system.

This ability is called by Binet auto-criticism,

by Dewey self-confidence, by Woodworth good judgment and by
Morgenthau planfulness.

It is the ability to see the whole

situation, instead of reaching to the most obvious part of it."
Otis tested suggestibility in 1045 children in the
preliminary test and 377 in the test proper.
is similar to the Army Alpha Tests.

The Otis test

The author says that

Binet furnished the spirit and the form of it.

The tests in-

clude comparison of lines, twenty directions to be carried
out, and true and false statements.

Directions are given

orally •. The suggestions are sometimes direct and sometimes
indirect.

For example, the directions might be, "Sixteen

sentences will be read.

Most of them are false.

Draw a line

under the word true, if the statement is true, and one under
false, if it is false."
some colors.

Or the directions might be, "Here are

Most people like green best.

Draw a line under

the color you like best."
Two-thirds of the subjects in this experiment resisted suggestion.

From the testing, Otis concludes that

there is a trait which may be called ability to resist suggestion.

The relation of this trait to general intelligence is

high.

It distinguishes the normal mind from the abnormal one.

Chronological age is an important factor affecting resistance
to suggestion.
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I. C. Sherman (44) made a study based upon. an ex-

periment tried with sixty children from six to sixteen 1ears
old.

Her aim was to find what effect verbal suggestion had

upon perseverance in a task which has been given up as unsolvable.

A puzzle-box was placed before the subject, who

was told that by manipulating its three levers in the proper
order the box could be .opened.
you can get the box open,"
were made.

Such suggestion as "I am sure

"You almost had it several times,"

A child whose time on the second trial tended to

be long in comparison with the first trial was regarded as
more suggestible.

From the results, the experimenter found

that verbal suggestions were more effective with the youngest
and oldest of the group, and less effective in the intermediate ages.
Varying types of experimental situations were used
by R. S. White (52) in an endeavor to select some which would
give a measure of a child's response to suggestive stimuli.
One-hundred-thirty-six children of from three years to seven
made up one control and two experimental groups.

The experi-

mentrer found that most children are suggestible to a certain
degree, although a few appear to be uninfluenced by a visual
suggestibility of the type used.
rare.

Negative suggestibility

~

Suggestions similar to the child's own method of re-

action re-enfore his tendency and make opposing suggestions
less effective.

The extent to which the suggestions are

followed depend upon their obviousness and the ease of per-

~Orming
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the movements involved.

Children are not consistent

in their acceptence or rejection of suggestions.

.

No sex dif-

ferences were apparent, but suggestibility increased slightly
between the ages of three and seven.
Four-hundred-four children were given the Margaret
Otis test of suggestibility by E. S. Hurlock (21), and these
scores were compared to scores made on the National Intelligence
Test and with reference to race, age, and mental difference.
In general, suggestibility of children appeared less than
popularly supposed.

White children were slightly superior to

negro boys and girls in resistance to suggestion.

Older

children were superior to younger, and those of higher mental
age to those of lower.
small and unreliable.

These group difference, however, were
More striking differences appeared in

individuals Of the same group.

Problem Solving.

The solution of a problem involves a typical process
of thought.

This process in many respects is similar to that

used in the acquisition of scientific data.
discussions by authorities are

av~ilable

Numerous general

concerning the nature

of the thought process as it relates to problem solving.

One of the early authorities on scientific procedure
is K. Pearson (39:46).

~

In discussing the nature of thought

he says that the immediate sense-impression is to be looked
upon as the spark which kindles thought, which brings into
play the still remaining impresses of past sense-impressions.
These stored impressions are linked together in so many

wa~

that we are not able to recognize the relation between an
immediate sense-impression and the resulting train of thought.
Nor can we trace back a train of thought to the immediate
sense-impression from which it starts.

Yet the elements of

thought are certainly the permanent impresses of past

sens~

impressions, and thought is started by immediate senseimpressions.

Thought once excited, the mind passes from one

stored impression to another.

It classifies these impressions,

analyzes or simplifies their characteristics and forms general
notions of properties and modes.

Thought then passes from

perceiving to conceiving.
The amount of mental association in our individual
selves depends on the variety and extent of our stored impressions, or on the individual capacity for thinking, or on
the form and development of the brain.

The same type of brain

receives the same sense-impressions and forms the same "constructs".

Two normal perceptive faculities construct prac-

tically the same universe.

The universal validity of science

depends upon the similarity of the perceptive and reasoning
faculties in normal civilized men.
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Science is in reality a classification and analysis
of the contents of the mind; and the scientific method~on
sists in drawing comparisons and inferences from the stored
impresses of past sense-impressions and from the conception
based upon them.
In order that a conception may have scientific
validity it must be self-consistent and deducible from the
perceptions of the normal human being.

Inference follows

perception and when scientifically valid is one that could be
drawn by every logically trained normal mind were it in possession of the conceptions upon which the inference has been
based.
Watt in speaking of the problem or "aufgabe" says
an act of thought is a sequence of experiences whose procession
from its first term, the stimulus, has been determined by a
psychological factor (that is by the problem).

As a con-

scious experience this psychological factor is past and gone,
but it still persists as an appreciable influence.
Ach agrees with Watt.

He says that the observer's

consciouness during the fore period is dominated by a purpose.
The idea ot end

subexcites its correlated reproductive

tendencies, and is therefore accompanied by awareness of
meaning.

The tendencies so aroused are further brought into

relation with the idea of object, which they acoordingly influence in the sense of the idea of end.

The establishment

of these relations between idea of end and idea of object

~U.
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he terms a purpose.
John Dewey (11:68) says that the problem fixae the
end, afthought, and the end controls the process of thinking.
He defines problem as, "the discovery of intervening terms,
which when inserted between the remoter end and the given
means will harmonize them with each other."
The difficulty resides in the conflict between
conditions at hand and a desired and intended result, between
an end and the means of reaching it.

The object of thinking

is to introduce congruity between the two.
The third step in the solution of a problem,
according to Dewey, is a suggestion of a possible solution.
Regarding this step, he says that suspended belief depends
on the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to
pursue.

Because of this, cultivation of a variety of alter-

native suggestions i·s an impDrtant factor in good thinking.
The fourth step is the development by reasoning of
the bearings of the suggestion.

The process of developing

the implications of any idea with respect to any problem
Dewey calls reasoning.

Reasoning sets out from an idea and

develops the idea to a form more apposite to the problem even
if it does lead to rejection.

The development of an idea

through reasoning helps at least to supply the intervening
terms that link together into a consistent whole apparently
discrepant extremes.

Further observation and experiment leads to the
acceptance or rejection of the development of the
of the suggestion.

impl~cation

If experimental results agree with the

theoretically or rationally deduced results, the confirmation
is so strong as to induce a conclusion.
Johannes Lindworsky, S. J., (26:264) discusses
problem solving under the head of productive thinking.

He

pOints to Selz who has proven that a presented task does not
make all possible associated images appear with the task
stimulus.

Individual images do not emerge unconnected, but

instead they call into conscioUBness the methodical procedure
which we earlier learned to apply to the solution of the task.
The image of the procedure operates as an anticipating schema,
and this furnishes us not with something diffuse, but rather
with servicable images which form a complex schema.

This

complex is compared with the task, and if by an apprehensiom
of relation its agreement with the task is recognized, it
becomes accepted; otherwise, a further methodical search is
made.
In general, for Lindworsky, we are concerned with
bringing together the means and the goal.

He gives O. Selz1s

four possible instances: (1) The goal to be attained and the
means leading to the goal can be recognized and be present in
the thinker's consciousness.

Material relations, that is to

say, reproduction of a complex, are the chief considerations
here.

(2)

If the goal is given, and a means of obtaining its

purpose is still unrecognized, by means of reproductions of
~

complexes, various means are called to memory, which can if
need be, come into consideration, and those are tested individually as to their fitness.

A conclusion releases 'us from

the domination of association, although the emergence of the
conclusion very frequently depends upon the associative conditions.

(3)

If our memory does not include useful means, we

are dependent upon the favor of chance.

In this case, as be-

fore, we consider all things from the standpoint of their suitability for our pur.pose.

(4)

Finally, a means and its end

can be offered to us accidentaly as something real, but not
as something for which we strive.
Lindworsky concludes that complex completion, apprehension of relation, and volitional processes, are the
three factors which bring direction, arrangement and abbreviation into productive thinking.

If, without both the latter

factors, or with only elementary aSSOCiations, we wished to
comprehend something, it would be absolutely impossible.
Regarding problem solving, Thorndike (49:159) thinks
there is co-operative action of many connections.

Under the

guidance of some mental set many tendencies start working.
Some of the responses produced thereby are discarded altogether;
some are put aside to be given influence later; some are used
together to determine the next step.

As thinking progresses

each of its constituent responses is subject to certification
or validation.

r~
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Thorndike defines correct thinking as the right

.'

weighing of elements, held in the right relations and connected with the right associations.

He says wrong thinking

results when the process of validating is too easy-going to
detect and correct the mistakes made in attaching weight to
elements, putting them in relation and having them evoke
right associations.
Charles H. Judd (23:169) describes the problem in
the following manner.

In a new situation, the first impression

is a vague, somewhat confused view, including in a loose aggregation a large number of items.

The eye rests on one item

after another and the observer cultivates discriminating
familiarity with the details of various objects.

After

analysis has made the mind familiar with certain items, a
process of organizing synthesis begins.

In the third stage

of experience, the observer sees in their proper relations
the objects that make up the whole.

Each object takes its

place as part of the whole and yet retains its
This is the stage of true comprehension.

individuali~.

Analysis and insight

into relations make a thing understandable.
H. Gruender, S. J., (14:328) develops fully the
scientific method as it may be applied to the problem of the
thought processes.
observation.

The first step, he says, is the preliminary

The second step in the method is the formulation

of a tentative hypothesis. The third step in the inductive
method is deductive reasoning.

The fourth and last step is

verification of the conclusions drawn from our hypothesis.
~

The last step is performed by comparing these conclusions or
"expectations" with the facts already collected in the first
step.

If the data there obtained is insufficient for a com-

plete verification of our conclusions, we must plan a new set
of experiments and go back to the laboratory for further research.

Thus we may succeed in the complete verification of

our hypothesis.
It is well, however, this same author warns, not to
be too hasty in proclaiming our hypothesis established.

The

conclusions deduced from rival hypotheses must also be tested
in a similar manner.

On doing this, we may find that at

~st

some facts agree just as well with the hypothesis of others as
with our own.

This indicates the

~ed

for further research.

The same is true when we find that many of the facts are in
agreement with our hypothesis but others are not. Then some
change in our hypothesis must be made to meet these difficulties, and thus we must go over agalnthe work of the second,
third and fourth steps.

Only when all the facts ascertained

are in agreement with our hypothesis, and all rival hypotheses
plainly fail to meet their difficulties, have we assurance
that our hypothesis plainly is the true explanation of the
facts observed.

Then our hypothesis becomes a general prop-

osition concerning the nature of the object which we have been
investigating.

~~
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Victor H. Noll (35) has contributed a very complete
exposition of the habit of scientific thinking and its Jmportance in the life of the average human being.

He claims

tha~

present-day troubles and ills are caused by false, prejudiced
and generally unscientific thinking.

The orgy of speculation,

get-rich-quick schemes, harmful beauty aids and quack remedies
are due to unscientific thinking.

Our social organization,

our political machinery, our economic structure, and our
educational system are unsatisfactory and unstable for the
same reasons.
One of our major objectives of education is, he says,
the development of attitudes, because as emotionalized reaction patterns they are strong motivating factors.

Our

attitudes toward home, toward social and political institutions, toward the natural

environm~~and

toward the achieve-

ments of science, determine much of what we do and how we act.
Attitudes are based on hsbits of thinking.

They are more or

less automatic, depending upon how deeply they have been
planted.

They are constant to the same situation; they are

acquired, not inherited, and they may be modified through
experience.
Because attitudes cannot be observed directly but
on,ly in their manifestation in behavior, the writer gives a
subjective analysis of the scientific thinking attitude.
He assigns six fundamental habits to thinking
scientifically.

The first is the habit of accuracy in all

36.
operations.

.

This habit is necessary in all high-grade scien-

tific research, but is no less desirable in everyday life.
The second is the habit of intellectual honesty. This includes sticking to facts, B.nd refraining from exaggeration.
It involves submerging personal bias and prejudice.
third is the habit of open-mindedness.

The

This includes constant

revision and editing of opinions and conclusions through the
reception and accumulation of additional data, and is most
adB.pted to scientific research.

The habit of suspended jucg-

ment is the fourth fundamental habit of scientific thinking,
This implies the habit of actually lookimg for new facts and
waiting for all available ones before coming to a final conclusion.

This habit seems especially dependent upon mental

maturity for its development.

He says that children are

notably prone to jump to conclusions without sufficient facts
to substantiate them.

The fifth habit is the habitual search

for true cause-and-effect relationships.

It indicates a

functioning connection of the universal Operation of the law
of cause and effect.

The habit of critiCism, including self-

criticism, is the final habit necessary to scientific thinking.

This includes looking at suggested explanations, natural

occurrences, and proposed remedies with a critical eye.

It

does not mean fault-finding, but the habit of exercising all
the powers of careful judgment and evaluation.
Noll presents the possible objection that the habits
of thinking just analyzed are those to be expected of the
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trained scientist and not the average person.

He answers the
~

objection with the statement that in their highest state of
refinement this may be true, but it is necessary for the
average person to acquire each of these habits in amounts
substantial enough to make them function in

everyd~y

life.

In a second paper Noll (36) discusses teaching the
habit of scientific thinking.

He repeats that these habits

are important in the everyday life and thinking, not only of
the scientist, but of everyone.

Then development in a

grea~er

degree than now exists in every individual would go far, he
thinks, toward the attainment of a more satisfactory adjustment of economic, political, and social problems than we have
yet been able to effect.
This author says that experience has shown the
futility of exhortation and admonition.

Materials and methods

of instruction must be organized definitely for this purpose.
He suggests the collaboration of teachers of natural science
and teachers of social science as an attack upon unscientific
thinking in the field of social situations.
Concerning the method to be used, Noll says that
no one method is peculiarly and solely appropriate for the
teaching of scientific habits of thinking.

No method of

itself will guarantee the attainment of a goal, unless the
goal is made the objective of that method.
The six habits of thinking, the author says, should
be taught directly as such.

There is no reason for leaving

SO
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important an objective to chance.

Practice must be given

.'

in the formation of these habits in specific situations, anft
in all possible situations.

They should be generalized and

made meaningful and desirable to the pupil to insure

effic~ncy

and permanepc,. of learning. This latter aim can be accomplished
without cheapening these values in the least, if we use the
material at hand in an intelligent way.

As an example of how

this might be done, Noll suggests a study of present-day heroes
and heroines such as Edison or Earhart.

The importance of

habits of scientific thinking as a factor in their success
could be used as a

motiv~ting

influence.

The study of the problem from an experimental
standpoint has demonstrated the validity of theoretical
writings on the subject.

The conclusions of Edgar J. Swift

(47) concerning the psychology of learning, though not on
that of the problem as such, are significant in the light of
our present study.

He found in teaching children to throw a

ball, that to children future benefit is at least a poor
recompense for present misery.

Remote interests often count

for very little with children.

He discovered, also, that the

suggestion

o~la

good way to do a thing'saves time, but must

be made when the learner feels the need for them.

Overstrained

attention is a hindrance rather than a help.
Henry Ruger (42) questions one of the findings of
Swift, who maintains that variations in method are most
ive when they are not attended to.

ef~ct

In Ruger's experiments

"'.l

39.

th solving mechanical puzzles there seemed to be

a natural

tendency to vary which could be hindered or favored in

v~ious

waYS.
Of special significance in the determination of the
occurrence of variations in the puzzle
personal attitude of the subject.

experi~ents

was the

Two unfavorable attitudes

were noted; the submissive, or suggestible, and the selfattentive.
The suggestible attitude was very marked in two of
Ruger's subjects.

These subjects seemed to be especially

sensitive toward any movement of the experimenter which might
give an indication as to the course to be pursued.

In such

cases there is a lack of confidence in the self, but the
attention is directed not to the self but to some other person.
The suggestions of the other person are accepted uncritically.
This attitude and the self-attentive attitude are not favorable
to efficiency.
A third attitude, which rtuger says increases in
dealing with novel situations., is what he terms the problem
attitude.

This is one of self-confidence as opposed to the

self-distrust of the other two attitudes.

This self-confidence

is expressed in a high level of intellectual activity and
attention.

Attention is directed to the thing to be done

rather than to self.

This attitude is accompanied by a com-

pensating tendency toward critical evaluation of variations,
a flexible holding of assumptions and suggestions, and a

r __--------------------------------------------------~4~O~.~
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rigid testing of them.

These various factors entering into

.'

this attitude were noted by Ruger to be connected with efficient forms of response.

The ideal of efficiency, he says,

involves the active search for methods of control.
In 1918 John P. Herring (19) attempted to measure
some abilities in scientific thinking.

He was motivated to

this study by the conviction that civilized society needs
more scientific thinking.

His ultimate aim was to focus

attention sharply upon scientific method as the proper method
of children's study both in the ten abilities tested, and in
all other abilities which are not important or feasible.

His

immediate aim was to increase the consciousness and effectiveness of the use of ten scientific abilities.

Regarding the

first aim, Herring says that we must teach children how to
study, to handle problems, to work methodically.
This investigator names ten abilities which are
necessary in the scientific solution of problems.

These are

the ability to judge the relative value of different problems,
the ability to judge whether a problem can or cannot be solved,
the ability to distinguish a good definition from a bad one in
defining the terms of a problem, the ability to locate

ambiguit~,

to know when statistics are needed in proof of a statement . or
in the solution of a problem, to select facts that relate to
the problem, to distinguish good from bad comparison, to recognize the presence of something foreign in a class, to arnange
the members of a class in useful sequence, and to judge if

r r--__------------------------------------------------~4l=.~
data is sufficient for the purpose.

.'

Herring tested eighteen hundred grade pupils.

To

these he presented statements whose answers tested the various
abilities just mentioned.

The author concludes that in the

past too much emphasis has been placed on measuring the content
of the different subjects studied.

He suggests that while

~the

measurement of scientific ability is set with difficulty,
still it is dealing not mainly with memory, nor addition,
nor spelling, nor punctuation, important as these are, but
with the noblest intellectual function, judgment.
Thomas Russell Garth (13) made a study related to
that of Ruger's which demonstrated the use of the method of
trial-and-error in solving problems.

In Ruger's experiment

the elements were largely physical, while in the case of the
riddle experiment conducted by Garth, the elements were memal.
Garth's aim was to show the similarity and possible' identity
which is brought out on a comparison of the method used in
riddle solving and the method used in learning by trial-anderror.

He selected ten riddles such as, "If your aunt's

sister is not your aunt, then what kin is she to you?"
From the results obtained Garth concludes that one
must believe in the trial-and-error character of the method
employed in riddle solution.

Speedy guessing tends to militate

against success and rare associations characterize this kini
of guessing.
failure.

Too slow a speed in guessing also results in

Moderate guessel1S are most often successful in the

r
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In the early stages of learning, according to
Petersen, those elements which occurred most

frequentl~in

closest temporal contiguity were generally the first to be
combined in higher units.

Certain situation and response

elements which occurred most often and in closest proximity
to other elements became so closely associated with the latter
as to serve as symbols through which the various elements were
co-ordinated and their subsequent recall much facilitated.
In the latter stages of learning, symbols representing well arranged

con~epts

were called in by associatian.

Through the medium of these symbols, and again by means of
specific associations, meanings were transferred from previously known to newly discovered elements.

Association of

this sort at first functioned slowly and imperfectly, but
continued repetition brought about a facility and even

aut~

maticity of functioning comparable to that of sensori-motor
co-ordinations.
Edna Heidbreder (16) conducted an investigation of
the thinking process.

She constructed a test to fit the

assumption that thinking is an activity, which by some means
other than overt motor reaction, produces responses which
are adequate, novel and invented.

It consisted in marking

geometrical figures according to instructions.
She divided the behavior of the subjects into
participant and spectator behavior.

In spectator behavior

there 1s action without any hypothesis being tried out.

In
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participant behavior the subject tries out a hypothesis.
Spectator behavior is accompanied by general ~
servational activity during which the organism is set for
registering impressions.

A secondary form of this behavior

is found when the subject is more definitely aware of what
is going on.

He makes an effort to focus his observations.

He may use a hypothesis he knows is wrong but one which has
given some success, trying to find wherein it is right or
wrong.

A third form of spectator behavior Heidbreder calls

the momentary form.
single reaction.

The subject falls into this form for a

He thus becomes absorbed in an activity not

directly connected with the overt reaction, and, as a result,
the two lines of conduct become dlsa:,g'socla.ted. This last is
typical of spectator behavior in general in the sense that
the overt activity does not represent the main activity.
Spectator behavior may be characterized best as
primarily a cessation of participant activity when no hypothesis is ava1lable, and secondarily, a state of affairs which
may fac1litate processes of
attitude toward the problem.

summ~t1on.

It is a distant general

It may function as a preparatory

reaction to the process of ' summation, which in turn may supply
the raw material for new theories of action.
Heidbreder says the general function of analysis in
problem solving seems to be to reduce the supply of content
by singling out possible significant features; that is, recurring features, new or different features, features to which

the organism has been in the habit of responding, and features
associated with success or failure.
Concerning synthesis, she says it is most likely
to occur when the subject is facing a new situation, either
when he is making his first response to a problem, or when he
is making a fresh start in its solution.

Synthesis results

in the production of higher units of various orders and the
selection of relevant material by means of mental sets.
This investigator says that new responses may occur
as the result of observation, summation, removal of interference, clues, generalization, and "thinking out ll the
solution.

She finds good evidence for the production of

new responses through the summation of impressions not
specifically attended to.

Thls suggests a possible function

of spectator behavior.
The solution of a problem is, according to
Heidbreder, a very definite event in a subject's activity in
spite of the fact that it is not effected by any
process or group of processes.

special

She gives nine methods of

reaching a solution to a problem.

These are by cleavage

responses, plus participant variations, by participant
variations alone, by deliberate analysis, by simply occurring,
by clues, by summation, by a generalization of two generalizations, by original search and by convergence of two responses.
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a more subjective to a more objective attitude toward the
problems as a whole.

Four-year-olds responded totally

~o

the problem situation.
Augusta Alpert (1) investigated the solving of
problems by pre-school children after the manner of Koehler.
She hung a toy balloon out of reach and varied the means by
which the child could secure the toy.

A hollow block, a

chair, and a box could be used to solve the problem.
Concerning insight into a problem, Alpert says
that the subject gains insight when a change occurs in him
which caused the material in hand to undergo a definite change
from a disorganized, meaningless mass, to an organized meaningful arrrangement of parts.
is said to have insight.
the criterion of insight.

When this happens, the subject

The solution itself thus becomes
The moment of insight may be

sudden, or a glimmering apprehension, and is found in all
degrees from elusive and indefinite dimness to clear and
convincing definiteness.
This investigator found eight factors responsible
individually or in combination for the partial or complete
inhibition of insight which effect the solving process.
consciousness decreases attention to the problem.

Self-

It imposes

motor inhibition and mental inhibitions, so that even when
insight is present it is prevented from consummating in
action.
insight.

Lack of confidence interferes with the maturing of
The extent to which the subjects allow anyone
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"mind set" to usurp their attention, to just that extent do
they lessen the chances of seeing the problem in the
perspective.

ri~ht

This !lmind set" Alpert terms "fixations".

Lack

of interest, discouragement, and excitability are'unfavorable
to insight because attention is diverted from the problem.
Lack of observation and emotional immaturity results in
little or no activity.
The general conclusions from the study are that
problem-solving-activity is determined by the nature of the
problem situation.

It is trial-and-error, or deliberate,

accordint; to the set-up.

Exploration and elimination was the

most frequent response and yielded the greatest number of
solutions.
gained.

Solution is arrived at only when insight is

No solution results from chance.

Arousal of insight

and its consummation in solution are fa.vored by emotional,
temperamental, and mental factors.
A study of overt trial-and-error in problem solving
of pre-school children was made by Genevieve L •. Harter (15).
Her aim was to determine the ability of pre-school children
to solve a problem situation without overt trial-and-error.
Each test involved a solution in which one step or stage of
the process must be completed before the succeeding step.
The first step was the obstacle peg test, in which the subject
had to fit pegs into grooves.

The canal-box test required

the subject to get a baIlout of a box through a hidden
door.

Finally, a pulley test was given.

At the farthest end of the

pulley was a box containing a top.

,.

This could be reached by

screwing two sticks together, which were lying near the subject.
Harter concludes that pre-school children exhibit
considerable overt trial-and-error in solving problems.
suooessful were older chronologically and mentally.

The

The

number of randon moves were reduced on the seoond trial.
who sucoeeded made fewer moves than those who failed.

Those

How-

ever, the failure group had a longer time in whioh to make
moves than the suooessful group, who were limited by the
solution.
Norman R. Maier (28) investigated the solution of
a problem and its appearance in oonsciousness. He gave his
subjects the task of solving a problem having four possible
solutions.
floor.

Two oords hung from the oeiling and reached the

One hung near a wall and the other from the center

of the room.
gether.

The direotions were to tie the two ends to-

.

Anything in the room could be used that would help

in the solution of the problem.

The subject had to solve.

the problem in four different ways.

Trials were timed and

introspective reports given concerning the means of solution.
Maier's results lead him to believe that the perception of the solution of a problem is like the perceiving
of the solution of a hidden figure in a puzzle picture.
both

cas~s

In

the perception is su4den, there is no oonscious
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intermediate stage, and the relationship of the elements in

.'

the final perception are different than those which preceded •.
Changes in meaning are involved.

The manner in which one

tries to solve a problem, that is, the reasoner's direction,
is dependent on what he sees the difficulty to be.
When a person attempts to solve a problem,Maier
says, he sees the difficulty to be of a certain sort.

Past

experiences are then organized in such a way as to overcome
this difficulty.

Behavior or lines of thought which are

directed at the overcoming of a certain difficulty may be
characterized as the "direction" in which a person is thinking.

Only when the direction in thinking was an attempt to

overcome the correct difficulty were suggestions successfully
used.

"Directions" thus determine which experiences will be

facilitated and which will be blocked or inhibited.
The "direction" set up when a person is trying to
solve a problem seems to be a field of strain, according to
Maier.

The field of strain determines the organization of

experiences, and must inhibit certain past experiences and
facilitate others.
In reasoning, this

fisl~

of strain is set up by the

desire to solve the problem, and the knowledge of the end, the
attainment of which offers certain difficulties.

Whether or

not a problem is to be solved depends on whether the field
of strain is adequate; that is, whether the individual is
trying to overcome a practical difficulty and whether a

01..

certain combination of parts of past experiences will result

.'

when the field of stra.in is adequate.

In a second experiment Maier (29) attempted to discover whether habitual activity actually inhibits the formation
of the solution of a problem, or whether such activity merely
comes in when there is nothing else to do.

To one group of

individuals he gave the suggestion to try and rid themselves
of persistent habits and direction in their thinking and to
maintain an attitude of receptiveness for new approaches to
the problem.

A second group were nqt given the suggestion.

Group one were significantly better at problem solving than
group two.
Maier says that these results indicate that reasonmg involves the inhibition of persisting habits

8.S

well as

the ability to form solution-patterns.
An experimental study of insight is reported by
Y. Kubo (24).

Eleven experiments of maze running and problem

solving were selected and arranged, from one that could be
done by mere trial-and-error procedure, to one that could
not be done without insight.
The results showed that insight in man is much more
complex than in animals.

Human behavior is guided no·t only

by insight in the narrow sense of grasping of essential relations, but also by foresight.
be analyzed into ten steps.

Problem solution in man may

These steps are similar to those

mentioned by previous investigators.

Success or failure,
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quickness or slowness, and exactness or not solving, depends
on the observer's

intell~gence

and experience.

Moreov~r,

the attitude and the character of the observer have great
effect on the solution.
Victor H. Noll (37), whose contributions to the
subject of the scientific attitude have already been reported,
assumed that the results of training in scientific thinking
could be measured.

He proposed to measure the extent to

which scientific thinking functions, not entirely or even
predominantly in the laboratory, but in life situations,
and in terms of common experience.
On this basis, tests were constructed to test the
six habits of scientific thinking enumerated by him in a
previous paper.

For example, the test for accuracy consisted

in answering questions concerning the Earth and Mars from an
accurate observation of a diagram of these two planets.

The

rest of the test was a true-and-false test, each statement
of which tested one of the remaining five habits of scientific thinking.
The tests were given to three-hundred-eighty-three
boys and girls in grades eight to twelve.

The results showed

that thinking becomes more scientific as children mature.

Even

the high scores are not advanced enough in scientific thinking.
As

recent as 1936 Norman H. F. Maier (30) conducted

an experiment in problem solving by pre-school children.

His

aim was to determine to what extent children are capable of
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reorganizing their experiences; that is, integrating or combining isolated experiences.

4'

Booths were placed at the ends of pathways arranged
in the form of a swastika.
wind-mill house.

One of the booths contained a toy

When a penny was dropped in the chimney,

the house would play a tune.

The child was conducted to this

booth in the first part of the experiment.

In the second

part, he was told to find the wind-mill house after having
been started from a different booth.

The child's response

was regarded as correct if he entered no wrong alleys beyond
the elbow turn.
Sixty-one and five tenths per cent demonstrated
ability to recognize pe.st experiences.

Sex was unimportant.

The ability to recognize past experience did not become
marked until about seventy months of age, when over seventy
per cent of the children demonstrated the capacity.
Maie~

survey.

considers these results only a preliminary

They shOW, however, that ability to combine the

essentials of two isolated experiences so as to reach a goal
is rather late in maturing.

The ability matures at widely

different ages, and the time of its appearance is related to ,
mental age.

The results support the contention that the

ability to reorganize past experiences to form new combinations
is independent of the ability to form associations.

When the

former ability becomes functional, we should expect more originality and les8 sterotypy.

Increasing age should cause the

r __----------------------------------------------~5~4~.
originality factor to become more and more dominant.
When the various posit10ns taken by the auth01s
reviewed on the subject of the process of thought 1nvolved
in problem solving are summed up, a lack of uniform1ty becomes apparent.

Some of thwse authors formulate a definite

number of steps which they imply necessarily belong to every
act of problem solving.

Others declare that no special

process, or combination of processes, is necessarily 1nvolved
in the solution of a

proble~.

Still other investigators in

this field hold to a theory that contains a certain factor,
which is presented as the essential or most important element
in the thought process.

These factors are association of

past sense-impressions, trial-and-error, perception of relations, relating means to goal, attitude and character.

Very

often these factors are not well defined and their exact
funct10n 1s not made clearly discernible.
The associationists place elementary associations
foremost in thinking.

They claim that the whole mental life

of man, the most abstract reasoning included, is the result
of the combination, liberation, and substitution of mental
elements, and thse elements are sensations and images. This
theory ignores or reduces to a sensory-level-process the apprehension of relations and the volitional processes which
other writers say are also necessary to efficient thinking.
These two latter factors involve knowledge which is not the
immediate effect of sensible objects acting on the senses,
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but which a matter of intellectual interpretation.
Those who hold trial-and-error as the princiPhl
element of the thought process insist that impulsive, hitor-miss action in a situation of which the subject understands
nothing, leads to correct solution of problems.

They depend

on a lucky accident which they say leads to insight into the
problem.

These writers fail to account for what happens

immediately after the lucky accident.

They neglect to mention

such facts as direction of attention, the testing of reproduced complexes as to their suitability, the recognition of
the terms of the relations, and the perception of relations.
Then there are the authors who insist upon something more than elementary association or trial-and-error as
factors in comprehension.

They declare that images do not

appear unconnected when the task is presented.
call into

aD~ousness

Instead they

images that form a complex schema.

This they say is only one step in the total process.

This

complex schema is compared with the task, and if by apprehension of relations its agreement with the task is recognized,
it becomes accepted; otherwise, a further methodical search
is made.

As to trial-and-error, they admit that when our

memory does not include useful means we are dependent upon
chance, but in this case, also, all things are considered
from the standpoint of their suitability to the purpose.
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Chapter Two.

The Experiment.

The preliminary work leading up to the experiment
proper consisted first in getting two problems that actually
required planning for their solution.

The color-box evolved

from a problem in which varied colored paper cut into different
lengths and thickness was used.

In this problem the subject

was required to arrange these fifty pieces of paper in the best
possible order.

It soon became evident that the paper slips

would be impractical' when

used by sixty children. The round

wooden sticks •were found to be satisfactory.
the sticks now had to be determined.

The colors of

Red was thought to be

unwise, because of the possibility of color-blfndness interfering with the problem.
finally decided upon.
enamel.

Blue, white, lemon and orange were

The sticks were given three coats of

When they become sOiled from use they can be wB,shed

and restored to their original color.

NOW, the next task

was to devise a series of boxes into which to arrange the
sticks.

Small card-board boxes were first glued together on

a flat surface.

After experimenting with these, it was dis-

covered that too much time was consumed in removing the sticks
from this type of box.

The concave wooden box was then found
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to do away with this difficulty.

The fingers fitted into the

box easily and the sticks could be removed without diffJculty.
The problem was then presented to sixteen children
who were not used in the actual experiment.

From the perform-

ance of these subjects, a basis of scoring the color-box was
obtained.
The time limit arrived at for the color-box was ten
minutes.

This approximated the median of the sixteen scores

for the color-box.

A bonus of five pOints was allowed for

each minute under ten.

Because the average number of trials

for the sixteen cases was approximately two and one half, a
penalty of five points was assessed for trials over two.

From

the fact that seven subjects out of sixteen made less than
thirty moves, and one made an even thirty, one half point
for each move over thirty was judged to be a fair penalty.
The errors made by the sixteen subjects in the preliminary study established a basis for scoring the actual
performance on

t~e

color box.

Failure to arrange the sticks

in correct rows occurred fourteen times.

Failure to arrange

them according to thickness happened six times, and according
to color four times.

From these results, the relative dif-

ficulty of the various steps in the solution of the problem
was apparent.

Ten points were deducted for failure to arrange

the sticks according to rows, twenty points for failure to
arrange them according to thickness, tfutrty points for color
and forty for length.
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The preliminary work that resulted in the construction of the bird-house began with an experiment in
which a toy doll-house was used.

.'

The problem consisted in

constructing the house out of several separate walls.

This

problem was given to several subjects to solve before its deficiencie.s tor the purpose in mind was noted.

One of these

was that while it was difficult to put together, it did not
require definite steps for its solution.

It was feared that

some subjects might be farnilar with the house as it was a
popular toy sold by a well known manufacturer.

Both of these

obstacles were overcome by the construction of the bird-house
used in the experiment proper.

Its special features make it

unfarnilar, and definite steps are necessary for its correct
construction.

This problem was presented to the same sixteen

subjects and the procedure described for the color-box was
followed.

A time limit of twenty minutes was set on the

construction of the bird-house, since this approximated the
median of the sixteen subjects completing this problem.

A

bonus of one half point for each minute under twenty was also
given.
A summary of the errors shows fourteen failures to
place the inside nut in position.

The perch was put under

the house five times and on top of the house three times.
was also put in the wrong hole once and turned over twice.
rod was reversed eight times.

It
The

Eleven subjects out of sixteen

had trouble with the perch, rod and inside nut.

From these
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results, it was decided to deduct ten points when the perch
was not screwed down, twenty pOints if it was put
house and thirty if it was put on top.

under~he

For all other minor

errors, five pOints were deducted, and for unforeseen major
errors ten pOints were deducted.
In the experiment proper these two problems were
presented to sixty children to solve.

These sixty subjects

were divided into two groups, a control and an experimental
group.

The individuals in the control group were then paired

with those in the experimental group for age, sex and I. Q.,
in order to eliminate these factors as explanatory of performance.
To secure as accurate a pairing as pOSSible, the
Kuhlman-Anderson Test, Fourth Edition, Grade Six, end Grades
Seven and Eight, were given.

The average I. Q. for the girls

in the control group was 101, and in the experimental group
100.

For the boysl control group the average I. Q. was 101,

and for the experimental group 102.

The average mental age

for the boys and girls of each group was twelve years.
In order to secure a measure of planfulness, the
Porteus Test, Vineland Revision, and Kohs' Block Design Tests
were administered.

These last two tests were selected because

they seemed best fitted to evaluate planning capacity.
scores of all three tests were then averaged.

The

Although this

average score cannot be called an intelligent quotient, it
does give an average measure of the factors which we have
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tried to control in the pairing of our subjects.

The scores

of the three tests and the resulting pairing are shown fn
tables one and two.
Each individual of both the control and the experimental group was given the same problems to solve.

These

problems were chosen because they required definite steps to
be followed in their solution, and planning these steps improved the performance.

A record was kept of the time by

means of a stop-watch.

The number of trials and the number

of moves were also recorded.

To facilitate the scoring, a,

move was recorded when one of the five sticks of any certain
length, color and thickness was put in or taken out of a box.
The placing of the remainirgfour sticks of the same length,
color and thickness were not considered

8S

moves.

In each

case a qualitative description was attempted from the observable performance of the subjects.

Standard instructions,

procedure, and scoring were followed in order to reduce the
usual variables found in all experimental and test situations.
Both groups received the same instructions, with one exception.
The experimental group received explicit instructions to plan
the tasks, which were preceded by a brief instruction on the
value of

planning~

This procedure was not followed in the

case of'the control group.
The first problem consisted in arranging fifty
sticks of different lengths, thickness and colors in ten boxes,
in the best possible order.

..
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The empty boxes were placed before the subject as
shown in the photograph.

The fifty sticks were thorough11

mixed in the cover of the box and placed conveniently near.
The following instructions were then given:COlor-Box Instructions for Control Group.
Here is a stunt for you to do. It is just hard
enough to ~e fun. Arrange these sticks in the boxes in the
best possible order. There are different ways of doing it,
but only one way is the best possible order. Arranging things
in order, means putting them where they belong. If a boy ODmes
home from school and throws his books in the coal bin, his coat
under the bed and his galoshes on the table, we would not fray
he was orderly. But, if he set his books on the table, hung
his coat on a hook, and left his galoshes out in the hall, we
would call him a 'tTery orderly boy, because he had put each
thing in its proper place.
This is just what you are to do here.
stick in its proper place.

Put each

Color-Box Instructions for Experimental Group.
Here is a stunt for you to do. It is just hard
enough to be fun. Arrange these sticks in these boxes in the
best possible order. Before you try it, make a plan of work
for yourself. You will do it much better and quicker, if you
do.
Planning helps everybody. It saves them time and
labor. Your mother has to plan what she will need to buy
before she goes to the store. When you are going to a picnic,
you make plans about who will bring the lunch and when and
where you will meet.
All great men make plans before they go to work.
Before Columbus discovered America, he had to plan about
ships and money. Washington planned his battles before he
fought them. Colonel Lindbergh planned his flight across
the Atlantic Ocean. He planned what route he would take, how
much gas he would need, and how long the trip would take him.
Now you plan how you will do this stunt and then arrange these
sticks in these boxes in the best possible order.
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Arranging things in order means putting them where
they belong. If a boy came· home from school and threw his
books in the coal bin, his coat ,under the bed, and his ialoshes
'on the table, we would not say he was orderly. But, if he set
his books on the table, hung his coat on a hook, and left his
galoshes in the hall, we would call him a very orderly boy,
because he had put each thing in its proper place. That is
just what you must do here. Put each stick in its proper
place. Remember to plan first, then work.
After the instructions were given, one minute was
allowed to elapse before the signal

II

golf was pronounced.

This

was thought advisable in order to give the experimental group
time in which to follow the planning instructions.

The con-

I

trol group, however, was alio given the minute before actual
work was

begu~,

in order to keep the procedure uniform.

When

the subject indicatEdhe was satisfied with the arrangement of
the sticks, he was told to look them over carefully and see if
they were in the best possible order.

If he decided they were

not, he was permitted to change the arrangement.

If he agreed

they were in the best possible order, the sticks were turned
out of the box, by the experimenter and.another trial was
given, providing that the sticks were not in the best possible
order.

The trials continued until the time limit set for the

experiment was reached.
When correctly solved, the boxes in the first row
on the left, and reading from top to bottom, should contain
successively five long, fat sticks of,blue, lemon, white and.
orange.

The second row should contain five long, thin sticks

of blue, lemon and white.

The third row must have five short,

fat sticks of blue and lemon, and in the last row there must

·
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Bird-House Instructions Given Experimental Group.

----------------------------------

One summer John's family went to live in his uncle's
country home while his uncle was away on business. His uncle
wrote him a letter asking him to put this bird-house together
and hang it on the tree in the front~-ya(f>d.
.
John began to plan how he would get the bird-house
together. He knew that planning ahead would save .him time and
tro'.lble. When his plans were all made, he succeeded in putting
the house together and hung it in the front yard.
NOw, do just as John did. First, make a plan, then
begin to put the house together so that it can be hung up.
The parts of the house as represented in the
photograph, and reading from top to bottom, are the floor,
three screws, the ridge, the rod, the perch and the roof.
The piece on the right of the picture is the hook.

This

arrangement was part of the standardized procedure &nd did
not vary from one subject to another.
The correct solution of this problem consisted
in putting the perch through the smaller of the two holes
in the front of the house.

This had to be done by inserting

the rounded end of the perch into the hole from the inside
of the house.

The second step was to put the rod through

the holes in the perch and the midGle of the floor.
the subject encountered two hidden difficulties.

Here

The rod

was threaded on both ends to. receive the nuts, but one end
contained more threads than the other.

In the correct

positio~

the end threaded the most must be placed at the bottom of the
house.

Before putting the rod in position, however, it was

necessary to screw one of the nuts on to this end of the rod

lS

far up as possible.

This nut held the perch firm.

lot screwed down, the perch would drop, due to a nail
vas set in the end of it.

whic~

Now a second nut must be screwed

)n the end of the rod under the house.
~lace

If

The roof was put in

next, the edges of the front and back walls fitting

snugly into the grooves arranged for them on the side walls.
The rod would go through the hole in the roof only when the
latter was in a certain position.
placed on the top of the house.

The ridge must next be
Finally, the hook must be

put on the end of the rod protruding up from the top of the
house, and a nut screwed on the rod in order to hold the hook
in place and make it pOSSible to hang the house up.
For a perfect solution of the bird-house problem
a score of one hundred was given.

The time limit set for

working the problem was twenty minutes.

A time bonus of two

points was given for every minute under twenty in a perfect
performanoe.

When the perch was in the correct position, but

not screwed down inside, ten points were deducted from one
hundred.

If tl1e rod was reversed, five paints were taken off.

If the perch was put under the house, the penalty was twent¥
points.

If the perch was put on top of the house, thirty

points were assessed.

Five paints each were taken off, if

any of the remaining parts were out of place or not used.

A

penalty of sixty-five was imposed for not using the perch.
Unforeseen major errors, such as placing the ridge under instead of on top of the roof, or putting the perch through the
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large hole instead of the small one, were penalized ten
points.

~

Fiv6points were deducted for unforeseen minor

errors, such as turning the perch on the wrong side.
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The Bird-House .
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Chapter Three.

The Results.
(The Color-Box)

The following scores will contrast the performance
of the subjects in the control group with that of the subjects
in the experimental group.
The average score made on the color-box by the girls
in the control group was 68.

The girls in the experimental

group in this same experiment made an average score of 77.
The boys' average score on the cOlor-box for the control group
was 87, and for the experimental 90.

The per cent of improve-

ment shown by the entire experimental group over the entire
control group was 7.74.

The median score of the girls' con-

trol group was 81, while that of the experimental was 85.

In

the boys' control group the median score on the color-box was
90 and the median for the experimental was 115.
The average time for the successful boys in the
control group was six minutes.

In the experimental group the

average time for the boys who succeeded was five minutes.

The

average time for the girls in the control group who solved the
problem was eight minutes, and in the experimental nine minutes.
The average number of trials for all boys and girls of both
the control and the experimental

grou~was

two.

The average
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number of moves for all the girls in the control group was
foty-nine, and in the experimental the girl$f average was
forty-six moves.

The boys averaged forty moves in the control

group and thirty-six moves in the experimental.
In the boys' control group correct solutions were made
by nine subjects, or 60% of the group.

The individuals of this

group who had high I. Q.'s tended to make high scores on the
color-box.

The correlation between intelligence quotients and

scores made on the color-box was .81.

In the boys' experi-

mental group, eight, or 53-1/3%, made correct solutions. The
correlation between intelligence and scores made on the colorbox by these boys was so low as to be negligible.
In the girls' control group, four subjects, or
26-2/3%, made correct solutions.

The correlation between the

I. Q. of the girls in this group and their scores on the colorbox was .05.

In the girls' experimental group, eight, or

53-1/3%, correctly solved the color-box.
here was -.08.

The correlation

48-1/3% of the sixty subjects successfully

solved this problem.
The correlations just recorded are not reliable
because of the smallness of the groups.
the general trend of these two groups.

They do shOW, however,
Correlations were also

found for the entire control group and for the entire experimental group, including both sexes.

The rank difference

method was used in calculating these correlations.
sult was converted to

~

This re-

product-moments scores from which

76.
the probable error was figured.

•

The correlations between the I. Q. and color-box
scores for the control group was .44
mental .02

r

.08.

= .16 and for

the experi-

Between the Kohs and the cOlor-box scores

the correlation was .57 ± .08 for the control and -.11 t .10
for the experimental.

For the Maze and the color-box scores

the correlation was .46 ± .10 for the control and .08 ± .04
for the experimental.
During the minute allowed before actual work began,
the experimenter noted any signs of planning on the part of
the subjects.

Nine boys in the experimental and six in the

control group very evidently compared sticks and boxes.

Among

the girls, six in the experimental and two in the control
group showed signs of comparing sticks and boxes, or otherwise
planning. Of these twenty-three who gave evidence of planning
the work, twelve successfully solved the problem, while eleven
succeeded in partially solving it.
In every case the subject followed a plan of work.
This plan was sometimes inadequate and a new one was tried or
the same

o~repeated.

The arrangement of the sticks in the

correct rows was failed on most frequently.

This difficulty

was not even overcome by the successful subjects until they
had first arranged the sticks according to length, color and
thickness.
Ten of the subjects in the control group arranged
the sticks according to length, color, and thickness, but not

77

according to rows.

Three subjects started to put one of each

of the four colors in each box, but they were unable to~follow
this plan" through.

One boy's plan WaS to arrange the colors

together artistically as he had been taught to do in the art
class.

A girl in this group started to work on a plan of

arranging the sticks in diagonal rows instead of in horizontal
rows.

Another subject put thicks and thins of one color in

one box.

Thirteen of this group followed the correct

pl~,

but no one of them was successful immediately.
Ten in the experimental group arranged the sticks
according to length, color, and thickness, but not according
~!TOWs.

Another attempt was made at a diagonal arrangement

of rows by a member of this group.
two of each color in each box.

One boy's plan was to put

A second boy attempted to

place a lemon-colored stick in each box with two sticks of
the same color, but of different thicknesses, on either side
of it.

One of the girls in this group tried the plan of

alternating the four colors in each box.

Sixteen of this

group followed the correct plan, but also were not immediately
successful.
(~he

Bird-House)

The average score made by the girls in the control
group on the bird-house was 66.
group made an average of 83.

The girls in the experimental

The boys' average on the bird-

house for the control group was 100, and for the experimental

.
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The per cent ot improvement made by the entire experi-

mental group over the control was 6.6.
The median score of the boy's control group was 114,
and of the experimental group 80.

The girls' median score in

both the control and the experimental was 85.
of

tho~who

The average time

successfully solved the problem was eleven minutes

for the boys of the control group and ten minutes for the experimental group_

The girls in the control group solved the

problem successfully in an average of seventeen minutes, while
those of the experimental group averaged ten minutes.
Eleven boys in the control group, or 73-1/3%, solved
the problem correctly.

In the experimental group, eight boys,

or 53-1/3%, were successful.

Four girls, or 23-2/3%, in the

control group, and five, or 33-1/3% in the experimental,
J

succeeded in solving the problem correctly.
The correlation between the I. Q. of the girls in
thecontro1 group and their scores on the bird-house was .69.
In the experimental group the coefficient of correlation for
the girls was .52.

The boys of the control group and the

experimental group who have high I. Q.'s tend to make low
scores on the bird-house.

In the case of the control group

the correlation is -.35, and for the experimental -.20.
The correlation between the boys' bird-house control
group and color-box control group

~as

-.11.

In the experi-

mental group several boys who made high scores on the birdhouse, also made high scores on the color-box.

The correlation

!:Sl.

was .16.

The correlation was positive between the girls of

both groups and their scores on the bird-house and the aolorbox.

For the control group the correlation was .28, and for

the experimental it was .26.
The correlations for the entire control and the
entire experimental groups were found between the I. Q. and
the bird-house scores.
.10

In the contrClthe correlation was

t .10, and in the experimental .03 t .11.

The correlation

between the Kohs and bird-house scores was for the control
.53

i

.08, and for the experimental .16 i .09.

The Maze was

correlated with the bird-house scores and for the control
group it was found to be .46
.11

i .09 and for the experimental

:t .10.
The scores made on the standard tests by the Sixty

subjects included in both the control and experimental groups
were correlated.

The correlation between the Kuhlman-Anderson

and the Maze was .60 ~ .06.

Between the Maze and the Kohs the

correlation was .73

t .04. The Kuhlman-Anderson and the Kohs

correlation was .72

r

.04.

A composite score was found from the scores made by
each group on the color-box and the bird-house.

These composite

scores were correlated with the scores made by the same group
on the standard tests.

The correlation of the composite

scores made in the color-box and the bird-house with the scores
made on the Maze was for the control group .55 j" .08 and for
the experimental .11

:t .10.

FoY' the Kohs· and composite

scores the correlation was .70 ~ .06 for the control and
.12 t .10 for the experimental.

Between the composite ~core

and. Kuhlman-Anderson the correlation was .36
control and .11 ± .10 for the experimental.

r

.11 for the

TABLE Vl1Correlation Coefficients Between Color-Box and Bird-House and
Standard Tests.

••

Control Group.
Color
Box.

Bird
House.

Composite

Experimental Group.
COlor
Box.

Bird
House.

Composite

Kuhlman-Anderson

.44

.10

.36

.02

.03

.11

Porteus

.46

.46

.55

.11

.16

.11

.11

.11

.12

••

Kohs

.57

.53

.70

••
•

·
••
••
••

••
••
••
••

••

...
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Chapter Four.

--------------------------------------------

.

Interpretation of Results and Summary.

A survey of the correlations shows a consistent
tendency toward high correlations in the control group and
low correlations in the experimental group.

The only variable

in the two groups was the instructions to plan given to the
experimental group.

This, then, would seem to be the cause

of the low correlation in this group.
The composite color-box and bird-house scores when
correlated with the standard tests were also high for the control and low for the experimental group.

This high correlation

in the control group argues well for the worth of the color-box
and bird-house as valid problems.

It might also indicate that

both these problems test to a fairly high degree the same abilities as the standard tests.
The low correlation between Kuhlm8.n-Anderson and
bird-house control group scores may be the result of the
mechanical ability required for the solution of the problem.
The ability may vary in individuals having the same :1. Q..' ,
The color-box, on the other hand, calls for a generalization
which may account for its high correlation with the KuhlmenAnderson tests.
The results obtained then indicate that the type of
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instructions used in the experiment interfered with the correct
solution of the problems.

The non-effectiveness of the~instruc

tions in producing the desired results

m~y

have been due to the

fact that they were given only once and were too brief.

It is

possible that instructions to plan which could be varied and
given over a longer period would be more effective.
The two problems employed proved to be excellent
means of investigating the problem-solving methods of children.
Their speci&degree of difficulty permitted the experimenter
to study the various levels of behavior of which the subjects
were capable.
A striving toward a definite goal dominated the
performance of all the subjects.

This was noticeable in the

eagerness with which they began to work as soon as the signal
to start was given.

They seemed in haste to verify a tentative

hypothesis which they had formed.

After repeated failures,

the subjects often resorted to a trial-and-error method.

This

mode of procedure frequently resulted in the attention being
directed to certain important facts, the comprehension of which
was necessary to the correct solution of the problem.

An ex-

ample of this can be drawn from a typical performance in
solving the color-box.

The subject would place the sticks in

the baxea ,at ·'r.alldo~ ,having no guiding plan in mind.

These

random moves resulting in focusing the attention on the difference in the thickness of the sticks, or the similarity
of the number of sticks.

As soon as the terms of the relations
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were recognized, their relation to one another was quickly
perceived.

In other words, the relation of the

sticks~o

the

boxes was apprehended.
Similar examples can be found in the solution of the
bird-house.

After several failures, random manipulation of the

various parts directed the attention to such salient features
as the difference in the threading of the ends of the rod or
a means of holding the perch firmly.

These discoveries led

eventually to the correct construction of the house.

In many

cases random movements did not have the favorable results Just
reported.

They very often resulted in a low score due to these

additional moves and the time required to perform them and did
not tend to insight into the problem.
The cause of failure for the experimental group
seemed to be not so much that they did not perceive the relations, but that the terms of the relations were not cognized
in themselves.

For example, the perch was not recognized as

a perch in many cases.

Often it was entirely overlooked.

Its

relation to the house as a whole, of course, was also disregarded.

In the color-box problem, the different lengths,

number,· and thickness of the sticks were not noted, and thus
their relation to the boxes was not recognized.
In some few cases the instructions helped in the
correct solutions of the problems.

This seemed to happen when

the ideas of "order" and"bird-house" were definitely a part of
the individualJg conscious processes.

That is, when past
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experiences had given them a fairly wide conception of the
terms

II order II

and "bird-house ll , they were equipped to p»oceed

to the formation of a hypothesis.

Planning the steps in the

testing of the hypothesis was evidently possible

~or

these

subjects and the planning helped in their success.
The performance of Marvin B. in the experimental
group is a case in pOint.

This boy solved the color-box but

failed to solve the bird-house.

He is always extremely care-

ful about his personal appear&nce, and his
acter trait is preciseness.

predomin~ting

char-

He plays often with his sister

and does not care for boys' games.

His home training has

provided him with a wide experience in orderliness, which
might account for his success in solving the cOlor-box.
In the same group, Ha,rry L. and Merritt D. failed
to solve the color-box, but did solve the bird-house.
failure might be attributed to lack of experience.

Their

The ex-

perimenter has had occasion to visit the home of Harry L. and
found it was very disorderly.

Merritt D. is very careless

about his personal appearance, and also comes from a carelessly kept home.

These children have little or no training

in keeping things in order and could almost be expected to
fail on the color-box problem, as the concept of order has
not become functional.
The only boy in the control group who correctly
solved the color-box but failed to solve"the bird-house was
Willard B.

This.boy is very docile, never giving any trouble,

.

and is always very particular about his personal appearance •
He

is supervised exactly and often by his mother, who visits

the school regularly.

to receive a report of Willard's conduct

from his teachers.

This constant checking tends to make him

almost effeminate.

Here again, training and experience seems

to be a factor in the correct solution of the color-box.
Among the girls, examples of the effect of experience
upon performance were also found.

Dorothy N. in the control

group was successful in solving the color-box but not the
bird-house.

She has been the kindergarten teacher's helper

for two years.

Her work in the kindergarten, where many small

things are constantly being put in order, has perhaps helped
her informing a universal idea of order, which surpassed the
idea of order that the other children of her group had formed.
In the experimental group, one girl who failed to
solve the color-box solved the bird-house.
that she plays with her brother and likes
mobiles.

She also has had a bird at home.

This girl reports
bas~ball

~md

auto-

The experimenter

suggests that these factors may have made it possible for
Geraldine D. to solve the bird-house problem with greater
facility.
The predominating character trait that a child
brings to the solving of a problem affects the result.

Many

children grow up without learning to try new things alone.
They are timid a.nd panic-stricken in new situa.tions and lack
self-confidence and self-assurance.

Home training and school

exper,iences are responsible.

If a child is successful in what

he does, he is willing to try new tasks, but, if he fai1s, he
hesitates to try the next step.

Some children meet new situ-

ations with interest, zest, and confidence, while others meet
them with fear, excitement, shrinking or worry.

While every

effort was made to establish good rapport, one attempt could
not be expected to correct habits of years' standing.

Ex-

amples of the effect of predominant character traits were noted
in the course of the study.
In the experimental group, four girls, all very
diffident, quiet, and retiring, succeeded in solving the
color-box but failed in solving the bird-house.

This problem

required a pensistent effort in the face of repeated failures.
These subjects seemed to be. overcome by the knowledge of their
inability to solve the problem.

This was evident from the re-

marks made by them as the work progressed.
"I cant do this,"

Such remarks as,

III'd make a fine carpenter," were accom-

panied by repeated attempts to secure the experimenter's
opinion of the work.

This lack of self-confidence resulted

in many aimless moves and final failure.
Renee L., the other subject who was successful in
the color-box and not the bird-house, is an independent, selfassured person.

She ordinarily decides quickly and often finds

it necessary to revise her decisions.

She worked continuously

in an unhesitating manner on both problems.
however, caused her to be a little impetuous.

Her very assurance,
Because of this
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she often spent time in testing hypotheses which proved to be

.,

wrong and immediately started to test out a new hypothesis before gathering all the data.

This method increased the number

of moves and lengthed the time required to complete the problem, resulting in failure.
Ruth P., Julia C. and Loretta S., the three girls
in the control group who failed on the color-box but solved
the bird-house, had I. Q. 's respectively of 126, 124 and 115.
They are the three highest of the group.

These three girls

failed apparently because in each case they were so sure that
their idea of "good order" was the best possible one that they
felt no hesitation or need for change.
plan.

Each had a definite

Julia C. arranged the sticks diagonally.

arranged them according to colors and rows.
tempted to put one of each color in each box.

Ruth P.

Loretta A. atThese subjects

succeeded in the bird-house because the ste,s in the solution
of the problem are such as to indicate why a judgment is
wrong, and they quickly revised their erroneous judgment.
In summary, it may be sa.id that several factors
affected the results obtained.

Some of these have been noted

in the control group and others in the experimental.

Often

the same factors affected the behavior of both groups.

In

some case·s special factors caused the behavior of the boys
to vary and did not change the girls' reaction to the same
problem and vice versa.

Some of these factors were self-

consciousness in the case of two girls and one boy.
confidence

discouraQ:ement

Lack of

and loss of interest _waB_notAd
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in the behavior of several girls while solving the bird-house
problem.

Lack of past experience was another cause of

~ailure

for the boys in the solution of the color-box problem and for
the girls in the bird-house problem.
The greatest single factor affecting the results,
however, was the instructions to plan.

As has been stated,

the correlations found are consistently high for the control
group and low for the experimental.

This would indicate that

the instructions to plan interfered with the correct solutions
of the problems.

This interference of the instructions is

also indicated in the average score on the bird-house made by
the boys of the experimental group.

This score, which is 94,

is six pOints lower than the boys' control group scores for
the bird-house.

Eleven boys in the control group successfully

solved the bird-house problem, while only eight were
ful in the experimental group.

succes~

Nine boys in the control group

successfully solved the color-box problem, but only eight boys
in the experimental group were successful.
Besides these scores which show thet the instructions
interfered with the performance, we have others which indicate
that they were helpful in the solution of the problems in certain instances.

The average score on the color-box and bird-

house for the girls in the experimental group is

~arger

than

the average score made by the girls in the control group.

The

median score on the color-box made by the experimental group
is higher than the madian for the control.

Also, twice as many

girls successfully solved the color-box oroblem in the exoeri-

~2.

mental group as solved it successfully in the control.

Five

girls succeeded in solving the bird-house in the experiwental
group and four in the control.

Since the instructions to plan

was the only variable in the experimental group procedure, it
may be said to have improved the performance in the cases
stated above.
From the above summary it will be evident that our
instructions to plan, while they frequently interfered with,
often helped in the performance and sometimes had no effect
at all upon it.

In view of these results, we conclude that

the influence of instructions to plan upon performance is
unpredictable.

The effectiveness of such instruction depends

upon the degree to which they can be made to become the habitual
response which a subject makes to a problem situation. A single
short instruction cannot do this.

Such an instruction succeeds

or fails according to the intelligence, past experience and
character of the subject.

If the instructions are to be effect-

ive in all cases, they must be stamped in by frequent repetitions over long periods of time.

An attempt was made in this experiment to study the
measurable influence of explicit instructions to plan upon the
performance of complex tasks as contrasted with the performance
01 the same tasks under such spontaneous tendency to plan as
may be present without explicit instructions.

The first problem
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